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ABSTRACT
Joseph T. O’Connell drew attention to the relative scarcity of academic work on religion in 
South Asia, and offered as a plausible explanation for this state of affairs the tension between 
secular and religio ‑political communal interests. This paper explores the potential role of phi‑
losophy as an established academic discipline within this situation, in the context of India. 
It argues that objective study, including evaluation, of the truth claims of various religious 
traditions is an important aspect of academic as opposed to confessional engagement with 
religion, and that philosophy in India is especially well suited to undertake such reflection and 
to provide corresponding education. Unlike Western countries, philosophy and religion were 
never clearly separated in India and did not evolve in tension with one another. The history 
of Indian philosophy therefore includes and is included within the history of its ‘religions’, in 
a way that makes philosophical examination of the truth claims of Indian religions internal 
to those religions themselves. By tracing this history, the discipline of philosophy can help to 
unsettle the idea of religion as a matter of fixed dogma. It can also continue the procedure of 
interpreting and evaluating metaphysical and epistemological theses that has been an intrinsic 
component of Indian religious thought for most of its history.
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PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY IN  RELIGION
At the start of a lecture he gave in 2001 at the University of Oxford (O’Connell, 
2001), Joseph T. O’Connell drew attention to ‘a troubling anomaly’, namely, 
‘the striking disparity between the prominence of religion, or religious fac‑
tors, in the personal and collective life of so much of the population of South 
Asia, and the extreme rarity of study, teaching and research on religion in 
the universities of the same countries’ (O’Connell, 2001). India is a prime ex‑
ample. While there are religious institutions in South Asia where particular 
religions are studied, these belong to specific religious communities, and of‑
fer religious instruction as distinguished from the academic study of religion. 
O’Connell describes the latter in the following terms: ‘by academic I mean im‑
partial enquiry, based on evidence that any competent observer can recognize, 
inquiry that is in principle comparative, but in a descriptive not in an evalua‑
tive ranking kind of sense’ (O’Connell, 2001). He contrasts such enquiry with 
a ‘confessional’ approach to religion, which takes place ‘from the perspective 
of a particular faith commitment’ (O’Connell, 2001). Reflecting on the reasons 
for the scarcity of academic research and teaching on religion in South Asia, 
O’Connell identifies a number of possible factors, but sees as most important 
the problem of tensions between ‘secularist and religio ‑communal political’ 
perspectives and interests.
India is one country in which projects for establishing departments or pro‑
grams for the academic study of religion at universities encounter resistance 
from secularists and face the danger of being highjacked by religious actors 
who favour the establishment of departments and programs slanted towards 
confessional or sectarian perspectives. In addition, there is the considerable 
risk of agitation by such actors when perspectives challenging their viewpoints 
or goals are presented. As O’Connell notes, there is considerable study of re‑
ligion in discipline ‑specific contexts at existing university departments in In‑
dia, such as history, philosophy and the social sciences. At times, work on 
religious topics in courses and publications within these fields has garnered 
hostile reactions from members of religious communities, issuing in disrup‑
tive protests and even legal actions. Cases include the University of Delhi’s 
decision to drop A.K. Ramanujan’s essay, Three hundred Ramayanas, from the 
history syllabus after protests by fundamentalist Hindu students, and the filing 
of a lawsuit to censor Wendy Doniger’s book, The Hindus: An alternative history 
(Doniger, 2009), by a member of the RSS, a prominent right wing Hindutva 
organization. Reactions like these raise legitimate worries about the feasibil‑
ity of establishing departments and programs dedicated to the objective study 
of religion at universities in India. Such worries can only be increased by the 
vilification of academic works on Indian religion in other countries, led by re‑
ligious actors and organizations belonging to the Indian diaspora. The reaction 
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by members of the Sikh community in Canada to Harjot Oberoi’s The construc‑
tion of religious boundaries is an instructive and disturbing example.
In this essay, I do not address the question of how or whether departments 
and programs specifically dedicated to the academic study of religion should be 
established at Indian universities in light of these difficulties. Answering that 
question requires a close familiarity with the social circumstances and internal 
dynamics of particular educational institutions, and this is, moreover, a prag‑
matic and political question rather than a scholarly one.1 In the meanwhile, 
however, religion already is the object of academic study in a variety of existing 
social sciences and humanities disciplines at universities within India. I want 
to focus on the role of one of these, philosophy, in advancing the ‘academic’ 
study of religion in India. The discipline of philosophy, as an available program 
of study at Indian colleges and universities, has been historically, and remains, 
a prominent site for academic engagement with religion. Indeed, of programs 
for the study of religion that do exist in India, many have been established under 
the auspices of departments of philosophy.2 Notice, however, that philosophical 
approaches to religion, or to subject matters commonly classified as religious, 
do not properly fit O’Connell’s distinction between ‘confessional’ and ‘academic’ 
study. The self ‑understanding of the Western discipline of ‘Religious Studies’, 
relies heavily on this distinction, especially among those who have struggled to 
separate Religious Studies from Theology.3 And yet philosophy, a primary locus 
in India for the study of religion, is neither ‘confessional’, in the sense of speak‑
ing ‘from the perspective of a particular faith commitment’ (O’Connell, 2001) 
nor does it aim at description and comparison while eschewing evaluation.
How, then, should one define a ‘philosophical’ approach to religion, and 
how does this approach stand in relation to the academic study of religion? 
1  That said, conversations with faculty members over many years of visiting Indian 
universities incline me to agree with David Lorenzen’s statement that ‘certainly religion should 
be more and better studied in Indian universities, but a strong case can be made that this 
study is best left where it is: namely, dispersed among history, social science, literature and 
philosophy departments’ (Lorenzen, 2010: 28). David N. Lorenzen makes this observation in 
view of the BJP’s attempts to promote Hindu nationalism through educational institutions in 
the past. This concern remains highly pertinent, as do other considerations about who would 
control the design of religious studies curricula and what their content and approach would 
likely be as a result.
2  Examples are the recently revamped programs of Comparative Religion at Visva ‑Bharati 
(Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion); degrees in Indian Philosophy and 
Religion offered by Benares Hindu University (Department of Philosophy and Religion); and 
diplomas in Jainology, Vedānta and Yoga awarded by the University of Mumbai (Department 
of Philosophy).
3  That includes authors contending that this separation has not been adequately achieved; 
see McCutcheon, 2001; McKinnon, 2003; Wiebe, 2006, for examples. However, one needs 
also to be wary of the unexamined presuppositions of such arguments for a more ‘scientific’ 
approach to religion (see Sikka, 2015).
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One way of answering this question is through an orientation towards philoso‑
phy o f  religion. The subject of this philosophical area is of course religion, but 
not every aspect of it. The concept of ‘religion’ is a complex one, and not easy 
to unpack. It includes worldviews, symbols, practices, rituals, and patterns of 
belonging, among other characteristics. Some have even argued that there is no 
such thing as ‘religion’, because the phenomena that have been grouped under 
this moniker are too multiple, diverse and historically dissimilar to be included 
within a single category (Fitzgerald, 2000; McKinnon, 2002; Nongbri, 2013). 
I believe this position is too extreme (Sikka, 2015), but do agree that no single 
set of properties defines ‘religion’ clearly and distinguishes it from neighbour‑
ing aspects of culture. Nonetheless, one facet of religion surely involves the 
advancement of truth claims4 about the world and the place of human beings 
within it: about a God or gods or transcendent reality, about the nature of the 
self and its relation to the divine or the ultimately real, about the possibil‑
ity of an afterlife, appropriate behaviour in light of these facts, and so forth. 
Philosophy of religion, as a subfield of the Western discipline of philosophy, 
has traditionally involved a reasoned evaluation of such truth claims. It then 
conforms to part of O’Connell’s definition of the ‘academic’ study of religion, 
in that it aims to be an ‘impartial enquiry, based on evidence that any compe‑
tent observer can recognize’ (O’Connell, 2001). It does not, on the other hand, 
abstain from critical assessment, although it should be emphasized that this is 
assessment of particular claims, not of ‘religions’ as whole complexes of belief 
and practice. I contend that such an approach should be included as a compo‑
nent within the ‘academic’ study of religion. It constitutes one legitimate form 
of objective inquiry, and is helpful in keeping alive a spirit of questioning and 
4  This term simply means a claim that something is true. In stating that religion involves 
‘truth claims’, I do not of course mean that it involves analyses of the concept of truth, or 
debates about the means of right cognition, such as those one finds in Indian epistemological 
discussions about the pramānas. There are scholars who claim that Indian religion is not 
about ‘truth’ at all, or involves some special notion of ‘truth’, but these claims are in my view 
problematic. Matilal, for instance, argues that certain types of Indian religious propositions, 
such as the doctrine that life is duḥkha, ‘are non ‑factual in the sense of being evaluative and 
relative to each doctrinal scheme’ (Matilal, 2004: 31). Yet he also speaks of Nyāya, Buddhism 
and Jainism as based on ‘rival ontologies’ (Matilal, 1990: viii), which are certainly subjects 
of philosophical disputation, and says of India’s speculative metaphysical systems that they 
‘fall in the area of overlap between religion and philosophy’ (Matilal, 1971: 11). Since the 
paths prescribed by different schools of Indian thought are linked to their ontological and 
metaphysical assertions, though, one wonders how the latter could involve truth claims while 
the former do not. Cf. also my critique Balagangadhara’s view of Indian religion as indifferent 
to truth in Sikka, 2012: 297–298. Analyses like those of Matilal and Balagangadhara are based 
on attention to the pluralistic nature of Indian religious traditions, and an understandable 
wish to preserve and promote such pluralism. Pluralism does not, however, require a strange 
notion of truth (Sikka, 2012: 298), nor should its existence in India be overestimated. The rival 
schools are rivals, and disagree with one another.
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reflection in an age where ‘religion’ is too often defined as dogmatic adherence 
to a fixed body of belief and practice, and ‘religions’ as rigidly demarcated sys‑
tems of such belief and practice.
In the Indian context, however, this orientation towards philosophy of reli‑
gion, which has taken shape within the Western practice of philosophy, does 
not properly capture the historical relation between what Europeans call ‘phi‑
losophy’ and what they call ‘religion’, where neither of these terms, it should 
be underlined, has a precise equivalent in Indian languages. As Asha Mukher‑
jee writes:
It is important to note that the ‘philosophy of religion’ in the West has its roots in 
and has been shaped by Judaic ‑Christianity […]. In Hinduism or Buddhism, we would 
find different dimensions and considerations and the question of philosophy’s relation 
with religion would appear in a different light (Mukherjee, 2015: 93).
Authors attempting to explain Indian philosophy to a Western readership, 
or who are themselves thinking about the relation between Indian and West‑
ern philosophy, have very often broached this latter issue. Radhakrishnan, in 
the introduction to his by now classic work on Indian philosophy, writes that 
‘philosophy in India is essentially spiritual’ and that ‘religion is India is not 
dogmatic […]. It is a rational synthesis which goes on gathering into itself new 
conceptions as philosophy progresses’ (Radhakrishnan, 1999: 25). The texts 
to which he alludes in making these remarks are the Gītā and the Upanishads, 
which he names as ‘great works of Indian philosophy’ that yet, he claims ‘are 
not remote from popular belief ’ (Radhakrishnan, 1999: 25). G.R. Malkani, in 
a 1949 address to the Indian Philosophical Congress, of which he was then 
president, expresses the point by saying that ‘the philosophy of ancient In‑
dia was tied to religion […]. It was part of religion, and a necessary part’ 
(Malkani, 2011: 556). Scholars today attempting to introduce Indian philoso‑
phy to a Western readership make similar observations, pointing out that the 
Western categories of ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’, understood as mutually dis‑
tinct and even opposed, do not accurately map the nature of Indian traditions 
(King, 1999; Hamilton, 2001). The difference is visible in the very terms used 
to describe the varieties and divisions of Indian philosophy. It is perfectly ap‑
propriate to speak of Buddhist logic, or Jain epistemology, or the metaphysics 
of Vedānta as a branch of Hinduism, and to study these in conversation with 
Western philosophical positions not similarly tied to schools of thought whose 
names are also the names of religious groupings. No modern Western phi‑
losopher speaks of ‘Christian logic’, on the other hand, or would discuss such 
a strange creature in a university course.
Why not? What characteristics distinguish philosophy so radically from 
religion in the West, but not in India? A central distinction in this regard is 
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that between revelation and reason, where in Western discourses these define 
religion and philosophy, respectively. Indian traditions, on the other hand, 
have not taken shape through a division between something called ‘religion’, 
based on faith in authoritative revelation, versus something called ‘philosophy’, 
involving independent reflection on questions about knowledge, reality and 
ethics. This is what Radhakrishnan means in saying that ‘religion in India 
is not dogmatic’ (Radhakrishnan, 1999: 25). Even if this claim is overstated, 
it remains true that discourses which, from a Western perspective, would be 
classified as philosophical analysis, speculation and debate have been internal 
to India’s ‘religious’ traditions. This is presumably what Michael Dummett has 
in mind in making the following observation, in an address commemorating 
B.K. Matilal:
the Indian religions at any rate — Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism — are, in their es‑
sence as religions closer to philosophy than the Western religions, which I take to be 
Judaism and its successors, Christianity and Islam. If you look at the Old Testament, 
the New Testament and the Koran, you will find in them very little, if anything, that 
could be called philosophical writing or in any philosophical style […] whereas in the 
Indian scriptures there is much that is of a philosophical character or touches very 
directly upon a philosophical style of thought (Matilal, 2004: 5).5
Matilal’s own views on this point, to which Dummett is alluding, extended 
even to the idea of dharma, the Sanskrit term with best claim (but still not 
a good claim) for translation as ‘religion’. Matilal notes that as a theory of 
moral behaviour, dharma was actually a central subject of debate in India, and 
he adds:
This need not be very surprising, for neither in Buddhism nor in Jainism, or even in 
Hinduism was God cited as the authority on dharma.6 Hence the search for a rational 
basis of dharma is often compatible with these religious traditions. There were, of 
course, the Hindu scriptures. But these scriptures proved to be flexible, sometimes to 
the point that they seemed to have meant whatever their interpreters chose to make 
them mean. Furthermore, even when the literal text of the scriptures was taken seri‑
ously, the interpreters of the Mīmāṃsā school undertook to make a rational examina‑
tion (mīmāṃsā means rational examination) of the meaning of the Vedic (scriptural) 
statements (Matilal, 2002: 51).
5  Cited by Heeraman Tiwari in his introduction to Matilal’s Logical and ethical issues: An 
essay on Indian philosophy of religion (Matilal, 2004).
6  Alf Hiltebeitel notes that Krishna in the Bhagavadgītā looks like an exception to this rule, 
but adds that Matilal’s point is nonetheless well taken, as ‘one finds the Gītā in a test with 
lots of other jostling teachings, where people often disagree with Krishna both directly and 
indirectly, and where what he says in the Bhagavadgītā is never cited anywhere else, at least in 
the Mahābhārata’ (Hiltebeitel, 2014: 22).
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In fact, it is questionable whether ‘faith’, interpreted as belief in a divinely 
revealed doctrine, is an appropriate term for Indian ‘religions’ at all, given that 
such belief has never been a defining feature of Indian religiosity, and given 
that open ‑ended philosophical speculation and argumentation have been cen‑
tral to the formation of those traditions we now define as, for instance, ‘Hindu’, 
‘Jain’, and ‘Buddhist’. The curriculum of existing philosophy departments at 
universities and colleges in India reflects this historical reality, in that offerings 
in Indian philosophy focus on texts, individuals, teachings, and schools that are 
also part of the history of Indian religion(s): Upanishads, Vedānta, Nāgārjuna, 
Śaṅkara, Vasubandhu, anekāntavāda, anatta and so forth. This is not true of 
Western philosophy departments, given the different shape of Western reli‑
gions as well as the configuration of the discipline of philosophy, due in no 
small measure to struggles between faith and reason in the course of European 
intellectual and political history.
Increasingly, however, Indian religion has conformed itself to the pattern of 
Western, and particularly Christian, ‘faith’, with religious communities seeing 
themselves as defined in distinction from one another through a set of sacred 
scriptures; a common core of belief, practices, and ritual; and one or more 
revered founding figures, such as a line of gurus or buddhas.7 The ‘religio‑
‑political communal’ perspectives to which O’Connell refers have played a cru‑
cial role in bringing this situation about. Actors on the communal side of the 
religious landscape in India have a powerful interest in maintaining a view of 
religion and religions as mutually distinct and settled bodies of belief, whose 
borders they seek to police. Within this situation, philosophy can help to rep‑
resent more accurately the history and reflective character of Indian traditions 
of thought and wisdom, while fostering at the same time ongoing critical en‑
gagement with the content of these traditions.8 Because it is a long ‑established 
discipline with a content and methodology that can claim continuity with in‑
digenous traditions, this kind of critical engagement by philosophy runs lesser 
7  This concept of ‘religion’ has arguably been constructed in the Christian West as well, 
as Wilfred Cantwell Smith claimed in The meaning and end of religion (Smith, 1991; first 
published 1963). Cf. Rajeev Bhargava: ‘this idea of separate religious systems to which each of 
us owe distinct allegiance is not a natural idea, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the great historian 
of comparative religions so brilliantly showed. Asian faiths, the great faiths of the East, are 
not and can become religions only with cataclysmic distortion’ (Bhargava, 2010: 313). I would, 
however, resist the use of the term ‘faith’ as an adequate alternative to ‘religion’ in the case of 
Asian traditions, even though in Smith’s usage the term does not mean adherence to a specific 
creed (see below).
8  Other academic disciplines in India also do this, of course, in different ways. Many 
Indian historians, for example, trace the ways in which religio ‑communal identities have been 
constructed, enforced and mobilized in opposition to one another, and/or draw attention to 
the fluidity and interpenetration of lived religious groupings that these processes have sought 
to erase (e.g. Oberoi, 1994; Mayaram, 1997; Dalmia, 1997, among many others). 
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risk, I believe, of provoking violently defensive reactions from religious fun‑
damentalists than it might if conducted within programs of world religions or 
religious studies.
I now want to flesh out these claims more fully by examining the relation 
between faith, identity and truth in constituting the nature of religion, in ori‑
entation to the Indian context.
RELIGION AND THE CONCEPT OF FAITH
In much of both popular and academic discourse, ‘religion’ is closely associated 
with ‘faith’ and often taken to be synonymous with it, religions routinely be‑
ing referred to as ‘faiths’. ‘Faith’, understood as trusting belief of some form, 
is certainly the main target of ‘new atheists’ such as Richard Dawkins, Sam 
Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens, who have been highly influential 
in generating world ‑wide discussions about religion, whatever one may think 
of the quality of their knowledge and arguments. Dawkins sees all religions 
as grounded in faith, and an internet search finds these lines quoted time and 
again: ‘Faith is the great cop ‑out, the great excuse to evade the need to think 
and evaluate evidence. Faith is the belief in spite of, even perhaps because of, 
the lack of evidence’ (Dawkins)9. Sam Harris’ most well ‑known book on the 
subject is called The end of faith, and like Dawkins his critique of religion con‑
strues it as belief in the absence of evidence. Christopher Hitchens claims that:
Faith is the surrender of the mind; it’s the surrender of reason, it’s the surrender of the 
only thing that makes us different from other mammals. It’s our need to believe, and 
to surrender our skepticism and our reason, our yearning to discard that and put all 
our trust or faith in someone or something, that is the sinister thing to me (retrieved 
from: http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Christopher_Hitchens).
These lines, too, are widely circulated via internet sources.10 On this under‑
standing, ‘faith’ is opposed to ‘reason’, following the basic progressivist En‑
lightenment schema according to which immature submission to authority 
is, or should be, replaced by employment of our own cognitive powers guided 
honestly by the best available scientific evidence.
Scholarly engagement with the category of religion within Western philos‑
ophy tends also to connect it with faith, as a specific form of belief. This con‑
nection is starkly evident in discussions about the role of religion within public 
9  Richard Dawkins, Untitled Lecture, Edinburgh Science Festival, 1992.
10  For example: http://www.atheistrepublic.com/gallery/christopher ‑hitchens ‑faith‑
‑surrender ‑mind; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QbfEme4DZYk; http://abcnews.go. 
com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/hitchens ‑remembered ‑through ‑15 ‑of ‑his ‑most ‑memorable‑
‑quotes/ (15.03.2015)
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life, especially debates about whether religious arguments and statements can 
be permitted within political speech. The reason religious speech is considered 
to pose a problem for public reasoning by political philosophers such as John 
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas is precisely that it relies on revelation and author‑
ity, thereby making argumentative moves that not all citizens will be able to 
recognize as valid. For example, in his recent work, Habermas argues for allow‑
ing religious discourse in ‘informal’ public spheres where opinions are formed 
because, he suggests, religion provides rich semantic resources for addressing 
modern problems. But he still disallows religious reasons from ‘formal’ public 
spheres such as parliaments and courts on the grounds that such reasons can‑
not be accepted by all citizens to whom coercive policies resulting from politi‑
cal deliberation would apply, and that is because religion involves faith (Haber‑
mas, 2008). To be sure, ‘faith’ can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and is 
certainly not always equivalent to the kind of crude belief without evidence that 
defines it in the minds of the new atheists. Insofar as it involves, at any level, 
recourse to revelation or authority as a basis for belief, however, faith is per‑
ceived as contrasting with the method of reason, and questions about its status 
are almost always engaged in Western discussions about religion. Habermas 
is typical in speaking of the ‘certainties of faith’ and ‘the believer’ (Habermas, 
2013: 375) in the context of his analysis of religion.
Yet ‘faith’ as a form of belief is not central to all forms of religion. If it is 
supposed to rest on trust in divinely ordained authority, such as a sacred text 
or ecclesiastical office, then ‘faith’ is not a prominent feature of many Indian 
religious traditions and cannot be used to define them as religion. Interestingly, 
Habermas often uses Karl Jaspers’ thesis of a shift in religious thinking during 
the ‘Axial’ period, naming Buddhism as one of the new religions that repre‑
sents this shift, but without noticing that in its original Indian form, Buddhist 
thought did not accept the authority of any sacred text and did not call for 
‘faith’. At one point, he writes that
[…] without the appeal to revelation or to some form of contact of the believer with 
the divine, be it through prayer, ascetic practice, or meditation, ‘faith’ would lose its 
specific character, namely, its rootedness in religious modes of dealing with Heil and 
Unheil [weal and woe] (Habermas, 2013: 385).
This statement is attempting to be inclusive, but the attempt fuses together 
under the label of ‘faith’ what are actually quite disparate systems of thought 
and practice, assimilating them to a model of ‘religion’ based on Protestant 
Christianity.
Now, ‘faith’ can mean many different things, and there are certainly coun‑
terparts in Indian traditions to some of the senses this term has within West‑
ern discourses on religion. For instance, when Wilfred Cantwell Smith uses 
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the term ‘faith’ as an alternative to the modern idea of ‘religion’, which he 
criticizes, he does not mean belief in authoritative revelation, let alone creedal 
commitment to a set of doctrines defining ‘Christianity’, ‘Buddhism’, ‘Hindu‑
ism’ or some other boundaried community (Smith, 1991: 15, 176). He means, 
rather, ‘an inner religious experience or involvement of a particular person; the 
impingement on him of the transcendent, putative or real’ (Smith, 1991: 156). 
In this sense of the term — where it denotes an openness to and correlative 
experience of the transcendent, or piety, or devotion, or, in a theistic context, 
‘an act that I make, myself, naked before God’ (Smith, 1991: 191) — ‘faith’ 
can be seen as an important element in many varieties of Indian religion. There 
are also counterparts within Indian religion to the notion of faith as a kind of 
trust, whether in a teacher or indeed in the words of a text, such as within 
Brahminical traditions, including the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, 
which respect the authority of the Vedas.
The term śraddhā is, in this context, the closest equivalent to ‘faith’, and 
there are many scholarly discussions of the multiple meanings of this term. In 
The nature of faith in the Śaṅkaran Vedānta tradition, Yoshitsugu Sawai exam‑
ines the various senses of śraddhā in Sankara’s thought, where one of these is 
‘a judgement that affirms Vedic teachings’ (Sawai, 1987: 20). Rubens Turci, in 
his study of śraddhā in the Bhagavadgītā, writes that it is ‘both intellectual and 
mental’, and ‘combines in itself the unflinching devotion and a deep‑rooted 
and clear understanding’ (Turci, 2015: 11). Being a form of devotion that gives 
rise to trust, the term can in some contexts be defined as ‘trusting judgement, 
or affirmative conviction — astikya ‑buddhi, a Vedic ritualistic state of mind’, 
which is, however, Turci contends, ‘totally different from later theistic forms of 
“faith”’ (Turci, 2015: 4). Turci draws here on Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s analysis 
of the term in Faith and belief (1979), noting Smith’s divergence from Paul 
Hacker, who, in line with his own Catholic understanding of fides, interprets 
śraddhā as primarily the acceptance of a doctrine (Turci, 2015: 6–7). Bret Davis 
rightly points out that in Buddhist traditions, on the other hand, śraddhā and 
its translations in East Asian languages applies only to the beginning stages of 
practice, the expectation being that what is first held on trust will eventually 
be confirmed through the experiences to which the practice leads. The ‘faith’ 
required here is, moreover, a matter of trust in a teacher and teachings, not 
in the revelations of a transcendent being (Davis, 2006: 7–8). Śraddhā does 
involve an attitude of trust, then, and can include intellectual assent to the 
authority of teachers and teachings. But in none of these senses does śraddhā 
name belief in the creed of a particular religion (Rao, 1971: 186–187), nor is it 
opposed to rational reflection within a schema where it would define religion 
as such in contradistinction to philosophy. As Krishna Sharma points out, the 
Western separation of religion and philosophy that positions religion as ‘a mat‑
ter of faith and emotion and not of knowledge and reason’ (Sharma, 1987: 9) 
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simply does not fit the landscape of Indian traditions. Astika schools are still 
schools of philosophy, and yet they are part of what we now call the religion of 
Hinduism. Conversely, nāstika schools are still religious, involving their own 
forms of trust, devotion, practice and experience.
Habermas, whom I cited above, is hardly alone in supposing that faith in 
the sense of belief in a special revelation is essential to the definition of reli‑
gion. Indeed, the interpretation of religion as defined by faith in this sense is 
broadly operative within the ‘world religions’ paradigm.11 This paradigm in‑
cludes Asian traditions, but is sometimes insufficiently cognizant of the guid‑
ing assumptions about the nature of ‘religion’ that form the basis for identi‑
fying religions and understanding the differences between them. I make this 
point not in order to enter debates about whether or not there is such a thing 
as ‘religion’ — debates that can quickly become tedious and sterile — but in 
order to highlight one difference between indigenous Indian and Western tra‑
ditions that gives the critical study of religious truth claims a different status 
in the two cases. Philosophical analysis and evaluation of its claims has been 
a central part of Christian theology, but has been conceived as separate from 
the mode of belief that is faith. ‘Philosophical theology’ and ‘natural theology’ 
have a relation to faith, and historically there are various positions on what this 
relation should be. They are not themselves a part of faith, though, and faith, 
understood in some fashion, has been considered essential to the definition 
of Christianity, its doctrinal content being fixed and enforced by ecclesiastical 
authority.
Western philosophers since the Middle Ages have generally worked with 
this distinction between faith and reason. When in 1793 Immanuel Kant 
writes Religion within the limits of reason alone (Kant, 1960), he is ‘translating’ 
the ethical content of Christianity into a form that he still calls ‘religion’, but 
which is distinguished from faith or revelation. Jürgen Habermas, on the 
other hand, describes such translation as secular precisely because it does not 
rely on revelation (Habermas, 2013). Martin Heidegger argues that ‘there is 
no such thing as a Christian philosophy’, because philosophy as metaphys‑
ics asks, most fundamentally, ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ 
whereas:
Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth has the answer to the ques‑
tion ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ even before it is asked: everything 
that is, except God himself, has been created by Him. God himself, the increate crea‑
tor, ‘is’. One who holds to such faith can in a way participate in the asking of our ques‑
tion, but he cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer and taking all the 
consequences of such a step (Heidegger, 1987: 6–7).
11  For one account of the historical construction of this paradigm, see Masuzawa, 2005.
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Heidegger’s very sharp distinction between the spheres of faith and ques‑
tioning may be debatable, but the distinction itself is perfectly intelligible 
within a Western context, and Heidegger’s position is a possible one.
This is not the case in relation to Indian ‘religious’ traditions, whose very 
core contains ‘philosophical’ argumentation. As I suggested earlier, it makes 
perfect sense to, speak, for example, of Vedāntic or Jaina or Buddhist phi‑
losophy. I am not here just alluding to the fact that, as Amartya Sen has un‑
derlined (Sen, 2006), the history of Indian thought is characterized by debate 
and critical evaluation, contrary to some Western stereotypes. Rather, I am 
pointing out that Indian religion cannot be separated from philosophy through 
the distinction between faith and reason that has operated to separate these 
spheres of culture in the West. The Upanishads might be considered ‘religious’ 
texts, and they are so, but they contain reflections and arguments about the 
self, the universe, and God that are recognizably ‘philosophical’. The same is 
true of Buddhist and Jain writings, which oppose themselves to what we now 
define as ‘Hindu’ positions in large measure through argumentative disagree‑
ment rather than a new revelation to which believers are called to adhere by 
faith. While Buddhism and Jainism do have founders and highly revered sages 
whose authority rests on special enlightenment — Gautama Buddha, Mahavira 
— following an enlightened teacher is not the same as faith in divinely revealed 
doctrine. Again, the central oral and literary traditions through which this 
enlightened message has been communicated have included ‘philosophical’ re‑
flection. While a certain trust in authority is required to follow the path that 
leads to enlightenment or liberation or salvation, there is no religious duty of 
belief, or sanction for disbelief, of the sort that has been associated with the 
requirement of faith in the history of Christianity. The very phrase ‘religious 
believer’ thus seems misplaced in relation to these traditions.
At the same time, one of the features often thought to distinguish Western 
and Indian ‘philosophy’ is the latter’s emphasis on varieties of transformative 
experience that do not fit Western models of ‘reason’. This would include ex‑
periences of unification, emptiness, or bliss belonging to states like mokṣa or 
nirvāṇa. I will return to this point later, but I am in any case not claiming that 
the truth claims within Indian traditions offering wisdom or enlightenment or 
liberation are entirely amenable to rational argumentation or are the product of 
such argumentation. I am claiming that rational inquiry is an essential part of 
these traditions, and that faith, understood as a mode of belief opposed to ra‑
tional inquiry, is not. The result is that ‘philosophy’ is ‘internal’ to ‘religion’ in 
India — using these ill ‑fitting terms for lack of a better option — a situation 
that cannot help but be reflected in the curriculum of philosophy departments 
at Indian universities.
This fact makes the critical evaluation of religious truth claims not only 
possible but unavoidable in the study of Indian philosophy, as there is no way 
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to understand the history of these traditions without rehearsing the debates 
between them, and those debates are internal to what have come to be consti‑
tuted as ‘religions’. This involves more than the claim that religious people can 
also be critical. In relation to the academic study of Hinduism, Maya Warrier, 
for instance, problematizes the binary between academic scholars positioned 
as ‘outsiders’ to the religious practitioners who are supposed to be ‘insiders’ to 
the critical gaze of academic study. ‘The assumption that insiders are uncritical 
is the first problem’, she notes, for ‘it does not allow for the possibility of the 
c r i t i c a l  i n s ide r  who has the ability to achieve analytical distance from her 
or his own faith tradition in order to critique it’ (Warrier, 2012: 47). She pro‑
poses further that ‘it can readily be argued that religion or faith has its own ra‑
tionality, every bit as valid as the rationality of academic scholarship’ (Warrier, 
2012: 47). These are fair points, but I am arguing that since Indian religious 
traditions i nc lude  philosophical argumentation, even speaking in such terms 
is problematic. For it means that these traditions are not properly described as 
‘faiths’ with their ‘own rationality’, and one does not necessarily need to ‘achieve 
analytical distance’ from them in order to engage critically with their claims. 
Their own traditions evolved in part through critical discourses, and engage‑
ment with this aspect of Indian religion cannot be conceived in terms of being 
outside or inside a ‘faith’. Religion is of course much more than philosophy, 
even if one conceives ‘philosophy’ very broadly, and I am by no means suggest‑
ing that the philosophical interpretation and evaluation of claims advanced in 
various Indian traditions exhausts the study of religion in India. But it is an 
important component of that study, and can bring to bear critical perspectives 
on the subject that challenge the faith/reason binary.
RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES
The discipline of philosophy can also play a role in countering the freezing of 
religious boundaries. It might be thought that the attempt to do so contravenes 
the principles of the academic study of religion, which is supposed to be neu‑
tral, examining religion rather than attempting to influence its development. 
Academic scholarship on religion often has a critical intent, however, which 
does not lessen its objectivity, and publication of such scholarship frequently 
constitutes, in its effects, an intervention in religion. For example, many schol‑
ars of religion in India have drawn attention to the fluidity of the boundaries 
between religious communities in India, underlining the fact that, historical‑
ly, there has been much overlap, borrowing, and blurriness between religious 
identities and that such identities have not always been defined in exclusivist 
terms. They have also traced the construction of religious boundaries — the 
title of Harjot Oberoi’s book (Oberoi, 1994) — since, especially, the beginning 
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of the nineteenth century, which has crystallized into communities whose con‑
tent and borders are regulated in various ways. The backlash against Oberoi’s 
study of the historical relation between Sikhs and Hindus, which claims that 
the division between these identity categories was not always as clear as it is 
today, illustrates one form of regulation. There is manifestly a strong desire, 
on the part of some members and leaders of Indian religious communities, 
to strengthen and maintain a definite and exclusivist identity for themselves, 
linked to narratives of historical unity and difference. These narratives work 
in tandem. The claim that Sikhs — or Buddhists or Jains or Hindus — have 
always had a particular identity defined by a firmly delineated set of texts, be‑
liefs and practices, or a common culture, or a clear line of transmission or even 
ancestral lineage serves to buttress the claim that the community in question 
is a recognizably single entity, which in turn is deployed for various politi‑
cal purposes. Consequently, historical scholarship demonstrating the opposite 
is experienced as especially objectionable, provoking hostile reactions and at‑
tempts at suppression.
No religious community in India, moreover, has been immune to processes 
tending to construct, distinguish and freeze identity. This is true of majority 
as well as minority identities, an important example being the formation of 
‘Hinduism’ as a religion, and the forging of the ideology of ‘Hindutva’ in the 
crucible of ethno ‑cultural nationalism. While this ideology seeks to position 
Muslims especially as ‘other’ to India, conservative reform movements within 
Indian Islam, such as the Deobandis and Barelwis, struggle to construct in‑
ternally uniform, exclusionary identities for Muslims, discouraging eclecticism 
and mingling (Alam, 2014). A very different case is that of Ambedkar’s suc‑
cessful efforts to revive (a highly modified form of ) Buddhism in India as the 
religion of Dalits, which made use of a constructed historical narrative relat‑
ing the ancient oppression of one group (Buddhist Dalits) by another (Hindu 
Brahmins). Such public representations of religious identity in India have often 
been guided by the goal of political recognition, as legislative measures de‑
signed to protect and ensure equality for minorities have the effect of incentiv‑
izing the construction of clear identities and boundaries. Consider the case of 
the Jain community in India, which has had to present itself as distinct from 
Hindus in order to obtain federal minority status, awarded to it in January of 
2014 (Vallely, 2014). The motives for such representations of religious identity 
often include legitimate concerns about marginalization and assimilation on 
the part of minorities. But the fact remains, as Anthony Appiah remarks, that 
sometimes acts of recognition are like the gaze of the Medusa, turning to stone 
the identities that are their objects (Appiah, 2005: 110).
The result, in India, has been a gradual ossification of the once more dy‑
namic and evolving content of religious thought and practice within various 
traditions, as well as the erection of barriers against the syncretism that has 
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been characteristic of religious life on the subcontinent. What emerges also 
from these processes is a concept of religion as primarily a matter of commu‑
nity identity, with religions neatly divided into packages of belief and practice 
that an individual inherits by birth. By exposing such processes, disciplines 
like history and sociology can and do play an important role in unsettling this 
picture of religion and religions in South Asia, precisely through objective 
research that demonstrates its historical, and to a lesser but still very substan‑
tial extent still current, falsity. Philosophy can participate in this demonstra‑
tion through history of ideas, examining the debates and disagreements among 
various schools of thought, the complexity of their mutual entanglements, and 
the many shades of opinion across the so ‑called ‘religions’. In doing so, it also, 
however, calls into question the very idea of ‘religion’ as constituted entirely by 
communal identity. Because the major indigenous wisdom traditions of South 
Asia did not distinguish between ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’, the critical evalu‑
ation of their truth claims — about the self, the universe, knowledge and so 
forth — is internal to them, as I have noted, a fact that actually meshes uneasily 
with the notion of religion purely as identity.
In India, religious identity is established by birth to a much greater extent 
than in Western countries and is less firmly tied to belief. Having been born 
in Punjab, for instance, I am sometimes asked in India or by people of Indian 
origin whether my family is Hindu or Sikh. The correct answer, which I duly 
give, is that we are Hindu. It would make no sense to the questioner if I were to 
respond that I am an atheist, or that I am uncertain of this or that view associ‑
ated with Hinduism, because the question has nothing to do with belief. The 
question is about identity, of a form that is not up to me unless I make a deci‑
sion to move from one identity to another, through, for instance, conversion or 
marriage. To a certain extent, religion cannot help but be a matter of identity 
established initially by birth, given that it involves more than individual belief. 
Other central components of religion necessarily situate a person within forms 
of shared practice, such as worship, festivals, rites, and pilgrimages. These are 
necessarily the practices of a community, into which one is born or to which 
one converts. But religion does also involve belief, and unless the religious 
community to which one belongs embraces a doctrine of religious pluralism, 
a condition that is the exception rather than the norm, this means that indi‑
viduals are also born into communities of belief. And there is something para‑
doxical, I would suggest, about the notion of b e l i e v ing, of holding for true, 
which is what it means to believe, on the basis of a community membership 
that is established by birth. The paradox is particularly acute in India, where 
religious membership is decidedly linked to a community identity determined 
by birth even for legal purposes, and yet many of the traditions on which reli‑
gious communities are based arose and evolved at least partly through critical 
reflection, in dialogue with interlocutors holding contrary positions.
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The policing of religious boundaries by communal actors in India reflects 
the paradox well. It is ostensibly focused on identity, rather than the truth 
of a set of beliefs, but beliefs are at play in defining identity. The case filed 
against Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus (Doniger, 2009) appeals to a section of 
the Indian penal code that has to do with insulting religious feelings, and the 
agitation against Ramanujan’s essay is about a perceived threat to the unity of 
a (constructed) Hindu identity. Those engaged in such forms of protest do seek 
to protect certain beliefs, but they do so by positioning those beliefs as mark‑
ers of a ‘Hindu’ identity that is outraged when they are challenged. Yet these 
interventions take place in a context where, historically, indigenous religious 
traditions (and claims of indigeneity are central to Hindutva ideology) have not 
been shaped through an idea of faith that would define religious membership 
by acts of belief. Thus, belonging is not decided by belief in this case; rather, 
belief is supposed to be determined by belonging. We are Hindus, the account 
runs, and Hindus believe x, the implicit premises being that Hinduism is a re‑
ligion and religions are systems of belief. At the same time, though, religion is 
also in India a matter of community identity, which is not chosen but inher‑
ited. Thus, an individual is supposed to be born into a system of belief held to 
be true on the basis of identity, although the logic of the concepts of belief and 
of identity are quite different, and although reflection and disagreement played 
crucial roles in giving rise to religious identities in the first place.
By tracing the history of reflection and disagreement within Indian tradi‑
tions, the discipline of philosophy can help to expose and unsettle the ‘belief 
by belonging’ mode of interpreting religion. It can also provide an alternative 
to this problematic (in truth incoherent) mode of b e ing  religious, by con‑
tinuing the tradition of interpreting and evaluating metaphysical and episte‑
mological theses that has been part and parcel of Indian religious thought for 
so much of its history. This is still an objective enquiry because it involves not 
‘confession’ but reflection and evaluation based on reason and experience. It is 
nonetheless normative, but as I have been arguing, the conception of academic 
study of religion as excluding critical evaluation is a questionable one, whose 
distinctions do not fit philosophy as it has existed in India or the West.
REASON AND TRUTH
One objection that might be posed to my argument as presented so far is that, 
while Indian religious traditions may not centre on faith, they do, as I have 
acknowledged, involve forms of experience not amenable to rational inquiry, in 
which case philosophical reflection can engage with only a very limited aspect 
of these traditions. Another equally serious objection is that Indian philosophy 
has been slanted towards the largely Sanskrit literary traditions that have now 
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become members of the ‘world religions’ group. It has left out the ‘little tradi‑
tions’, the local village traditions followed by large numbers of people in India, 
or relegated these to the realm of custom and superstition, thereby reinforcing 
questionable hierarchies of truth. Furthermore, since a major portion of the 
Sanskrit traditions that form the canon of Indian philosophy are Brahminical 
ones, they may be viewed as the intellectual products of an oppressive elite, and 
even as nothing more than ideology serving the dominating interests of that 
elite.
Responding to these objections requires reflection on the nature of philo‑
sophical enquiry, as well as on the shape of philosophy curricula in India. It 
also requires that some decisions be made about these matters, for neither the 
methodology nor the subjects of philosophy are fixed in stone. Philosophy 
is usually thought to involve ‘rational’ analysis and evaluation, but the mean‑
ing of ‘reason’ is far from obvious and admits of considerable variation. To be 
sure, many of the analyses and arguments presented by the classical schools of 
thought in ancient and medieval India — orthodox, Jain, Buddhist — fit quite 
easily under even an unmodified modern Western understanding of philosophy 
and philosophical reasoning. This is also true of the writings of many modern 
Indian philosophers who engage with these schools of thought in dialogue 
with Western philosophy, such as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, K.C. Bhattacha‑
rya and B.K. Matilal, not to mention the numerous contemporary scholars of 
Indian philosophy who have emphasized and examined its rational character: 
Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Johannes Bronkhorst, and Jonardon Ganeri, to name 
but a few eminent examples.
There are, however, other elements within Indian traditions that are less 
easily assimilated to a particular modern Western concept of philosophy. One 
of these is the fact that Indian philosophy has rarely been purely theoretical; 
it is usually linked in some fashion to existential and soteriological goals, with 
metaphysical and epistemological views having profound implications for life 
and liberation. In truth, though, it is only a narrow modern spectrum of West‑
ern philosophy that divorces concerns about the art of living from the idea of 
philosophy. Ancient Greek philosophy did not, and in this respect (as well as 
others) more closely resembles ancient Indian philosophy than either of these 
resemble, say, modern analytic philosophy. Much continental philosophy, 
moreover, has retained the link between reflection and life, as well as includ‑
ing a broader range of styles and methodologies in its understanding of what 
counts as ‘philosophy’.
Indian thought has also sometimes been excluded from philosophy as a ra‑
tional enterprise on the grounds that it involves a species of ‘mysticism’. The 
underlying judgement is that the Indian discourses in question make truth 
claims based on extraordinary and essentially private experiences, which cannot 
be intersubjectively verified or subjected to rational scrutiny. Claiming insight 
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on the basis of such experiences might be different from having faith in revela‑
tion, but these modes of believing, it might be argued, have in common an 
appeal to a non ‑rational basis for belief. This places them outside the scope of 
philosophy, except as the special object of philosophy of religion, for which 
examination of religious or mystical experience is a topic.
Philosophy is useful for analyzing and assessing varieties of experience gen‑
erally, but I would also challenge the interpretation of certain kinds of ex‑
perience as ‘mystical’ in a way that opposes them to ‘reason’ and in so doing 
connects them with religion rather than philosophy. In truth, although I am 
the author of a book with the term ‘mystical’ in its title (Sikka, 1997), I have 
increasingly come to avoid this term because it covers far too many radically 
disparate phenomena, and because it is often deployed as a way of dismissing 
experiences deserving of closer analysis, including ones contained within both 
Indian and Western philosophy. I am referring here not to a l l  experiences that 
might be termed ‘mystical’ — there is in my view no such coherent set — but 
to a particular type that is in fact slowly but increasingly being distinguished 
from the exclusive provenance of ‘religion’ in Western discourses. This type 
includes, but is not limited to, experiences of pure consciousness, or witness 
consciousness, or the dissolution of our usual sense of being a bounded self.12 
Describing these kinds of experiences as ‘mystical’, thereby positioning as non‑
‑rational and thus also extra ‑philosophical any discourse that might be con‑
nected to them, mischaracterizes the nature of Indian (and arguably not only 
Indian)13 ideas in which such experiences play a role.
Consider the debates within Indian philosophy about whether there exists 
a single, unified self. Figures such as Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara articulate oppos‑
ing positions on this issue and are identified, respectively, as ‘Buddhist’ and 
‘Hindu’ on the world religions map. It is not true, however, that the positions 
which situate them differently on this map arise from ‘mystical’ intuition of 
a sort that is inaccessible to reason. After all, they present arguments, for and 
against the real existence of the self, a doctrinal difference that has been central 
to the distinction between Buddhism and Hinduism in India. Introspective 
examination, along with ascetic forms of life, are considered to be impor‑
tant components of the process that leads to insight into the truth of self or 
non ‑self within different schools. But their claims about this matter, which 
12  Such experiences have been confessed by no less militant an atheist than Sam Harris 
(Harris, 2014). Cf. Forman, 1990; Siderits, Thompson, & Zahavi, 2011.
13  I am thinking here of Western ‘mystical’ thinkers like Meister Eckhart, as well as, 
on some readings, contemporary philosophers such as Heidegger and even Husserl. There 
are also interpretations of Plato that highlight the religious and mystical dimensions of his 
thought, such as those of J.N. Mohanty and John Niemeyer Findlay, who also drew on Plato 
in developing his own position on the essential place of the ‘mystical’ in human understanding 
and experience (Findlay, 1966; Findlay, 1967).
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actually form a complex range of views rather than dividing sharply into a self/
no ‑self binary, are not based on appeal to an inaccessible experience about 
which there can be no reasoned dispute. There is still a difference between 
theoretical reflection and experience, but a distinction between experience and 
theory is something quite different from a distinction between reason and 
‘mysticism’.
Again, because of the character of these indigenous traditions, the discipline 
of philosophy in India is, I am suggesting, better situated than its Western 
counterpart to examine and assess the truth claims of at least some Indian 
religions in a manner that is continuous with their own reflective practices. 
The distinction between ‘philosophy’ and ‘religion’ is relatively new to the 
subcontinent, being a feature of its modern history in interaction with Western 
ideas. In the modern West, the distinction is a product of its specific history: 
of the interactions and tensions between its Greek and biblical sources and the 
political struggles between Church and state. The conceptual configurations 
resulting from that history, however, have shaped the course of intellectual and 
cultural life in many non ‑Western nations as well, and centrally determine the 
self ‑conception and methodology of academic disciplines. Thus, the discipline 
of philosophy in India also understands itself to be a ‘rational’ enterprise, and 
distinguishes itself from religion. But in comparison with philosophers trained 
exclusively in Western ideas and approaches, those conversant with Indian tra‑
ditions are less likely immediately to interpret as ‘religious’ modes of thought 
that do not conform to a very specific and historically contingent shape of rea‑
son. The sympathetic and yet critical space for engagement with the claims of 
religion that this difference leaves open is valuable in a context where religions 
in India have themselves increasingly come to conform to Western models, 
a process embraced and fostered by the interests that O’Connell, for one, iden‑
tifies as posing the most serious barrier to the academic study of religion in 
India generally.
Turning to the question of philosophy’s curriculum, it is true that the dis‑
cipline is by nature language ‑oriented and therefore unavoidably focused on 
literary traditions. Its orientation is consequently slanted towards the ‘great’ 
traditions, and the ‘little’ traditions in India may well be better represented 
through anthropological, sociological and literary studies. Many crucial aspects 
of religion lie outside the province of philosophy in any case, and I am not ar‑
guing for a privileged or exclusive role for philosophy in the academic study of 
religion. I am trying only to isolate what I believe are its specific merits as one 
among a group of disciplines within whose parameters such study can be un‑
dertaken, especially in the absence of Religious Studies departments that incor‑
porate a variety of approaches. Concerns about the representation of little tra‑
ditions in India tend to target more than issues of adequate coverage, though, 
and connect with critiques of intellectual discourses that, it is argued, reinforce 
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class and caste hierarchies. While the dividing line and relation between ‘little’ 
and ‘great’ traditions is not clear ‑cut (Padma, 2013: 30–45), sociological and 
historical studies have generally connected the former with lower castes, not‑
ing the divergences of their practices, gods and worship from ‘philosophical 
Hinduism’ (Padma, 2013: 33). Moreover, the blurred boundaries and syncre‑
tism that are often noted as salutary features of Indian religion, reflecting lived 
practices of peaceful co ‑existence, are often contrasted with upper caste literate 
forms of religion and the textual sources linked to them, particularly those 
of Brahminical Hinduism. If ‘Indian philosophy’ consists primarily of these 
texts, it might be objected, then it functions to reinforce, not challenge, both 
caste hierarchy and the divisions between communal groupings that have been 
a source of serious violence in modern India.
Uncritical and politically unselfconscious engagement with the Brahminical 
corpus of Indian philosophy is a danger, but that is of course not the only way 
of approaching this corpus. Philosophical approaches can and should be aware 
of the place of such texts within social hierarchies, highlighting rather than 
marginalizing their inegalitarian dimensions. Philosophy curricula also can and 
do include historical as well as modern perspectives critical of these hierarchies, 
from ancient Buddhist scriptures to the debates on caste between Ambedkar and 
Gandhi. In addition, ‘reason’ and ‘philosophy’ need not and generally are not 
construed as narrowly in India as they are in Western disciplinary practices of 
philosophy. Philosophy may be inescapably oriented towards literary traditions, 
but it can incorporate a wide range of reflective discourses. For instance, Gandhi 
and Rabindranath Tagore are typically represented in the Indian canon of phi‑
losophy, although neither was an academic philosopher and isolating the philo‑
sophical content of their thought requires some reconstruction. Even Kabir’s 
poetic reflections on the true meanings of purity and pollution, which challenge 
Brahminical interpretations and expose them as hypocritical, can be counted as 
critical reasoning of a sort, for such reasoning does not have to go ‘all the way 
down’ to be valid; reasoning is always contextual, holding certain premises steady 
while challenging others. Kabir might not normally be considered a philosopher 
himself, but insofar as his ideas belong to a particular history of religious/philo‑
sophical (again, I conflate these terms deliberately) contestation, they can readily 
be examined within the discipline of philosophy as an academic subject.14
14  Challenging a modern Western schema that distinguishes between ‘religion’ as devotion to 
a personal deity from ‘philosophy’ as purely intellectual assent to positions like monism (Sharma, 
1987: 8–9), Krishna Sharma describes Kabir as a nirguṇa bhakta, whose devotionalism is monistic 
and cannot be understood as ‘the antithesis of the Advaita Vedanta and as a path opposed to that 
of jñāna’ (Sharma, 1987: 162). She also notes that ‘although Kabir had scant regard for scholastic 
learning, he had a highly intellectual and rational approach to religious dogmas and conventions’ 
and that ‘Kabir’s concept of jñāna includes the intellectual faculty of discrimination or viveka 
which he regards as the chief guide in spiritual quest’ (Sharma, 1987: 169).
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My central point, however, is that although religion is not only a set of 
beliefs, it does include beliefs and beliefs by their very nature assert truth 
claims.15 The assessment of such truth claims has been an important part of 
Indian religious traditions in their evolution and relation to one another, and, 
I am arguing, should continue as a component of intellectual engagement with 
religion. Philosophy can play a specific role within such engagement, assess‑
ing metaphysical and epistemological views in a way that it has in fact al‑
ways done as a methodology internal to Indian ‘religious’ thought (a fact that, 
from the horizon of Western categories, problematizes the characterization of 
this thought as ‘religious’). In the lecture by O’Connell to which I referred 
at the beginning of this paper, he commends programs emphasizing inter‑
‑faith dialogue and premised on the view that true religion promotes peace 
and toleration. But he also warns of ‘a risk that students’ and even teachers’ 
perceptiveness of the complexities and ambiguities in religion may be dulled 
or inhibited’ through such approaches, which may result in ‘a tendency to rely 
on platitudes rather than reasoned evidence ‑based arguments and conclusions, 
to confuse research with edification and advocacy’ (O’Connell, 2001). Interest‑
ingly, O’Connell’s worry is echoed in an observation by researchers conduct‑
ing a study of Religion Education programs in British schools, who note that 
many of the participants in their study
[…] expressed concerns which echo Stern’s (2007) critique of a tolerance of ‘nice’ 
things: treating all religions as forms of civic order — drawing attention, for example, 
15  It is often claimed that Indian religious traditions, especially Hinduism, have in the 
main emphasized ‘orthopraxy’ over ‘orthodoxy’, implying that right belief is not central to 
these traditions (e.g. Thapar, 2007). However, while it is true that holding ‘right belief ’ is 
not emphasized within Indian religion in the way that it is within Christianity, as I have been 
arguing myself in this article, most practices are still based on beliefs of some sort. These 
may not be explicit, and those who participate in religious practices may not be able to give 
a sophisticated theological account of their beliefs. But that does not mean we should suppose 
they have no  views at all about the point of their practices — about why it is obligatory or 
efficacious for them to perform a certain puja, for instance, or go on a pilgrimage to a particular 
shrine. Some have argued, on the other hand, that ritual is prior to belief, and Frits Staal goes so 
far as to claim that ‘ritual is pure activity, without meaning or goal’ (Staal, 1996: 131). However, 
such interpretations, universally applied, fail to explain criticisms and abandonments of ritual 
on the grounds that they are ineffective superstitions or indeed meaningless. Yet rejections 
of ritual on such grounds are common enough within societies where the rituals at issue are 
being performed (India is as good an example as any), and presuppose that their performance 
is s u p p o s e d  to have a point. Such challenges are also not a product of modernity; witness 
the criticisms of sacrificial rites attributed to the Cārvakas in the Prabodhacandrodaya (Misra, 
1988: 41). This is not to deny that rituals have an expressive and symbolic aspect that may in 
some cases exhaust their meaning, as when religious ceremonies marking important life stages 
are performed by individuals who do not possess any religious beliefs. And it is true that rituals 
may be performed in the absence of meaning — but ‘empty ritual’ is not the definition of 
ritual, nor is it, I believe, the norm.
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to the presence of texts approximating to the Golden Rule in all major world faiths, 
while eliding the very different metaphysical and teleological bases from which they 
are derived, ‘leaving public spaces free of truth but implacably tolerant’ (Conroy et al., 
2013: 119).
These remarks are directed towards descriptive accounts of religion rather 
than the evaluation of truth claims on which I have been focusing. But accurate 
descriptions of the history and present condition of religion in India and else‑
where make it difficult to sustain the claim that ‘true’ religion is peaceful and 
tolerant. The core claims of many, perhaps most, religious traditions are not 
pluralistic. Religious pluralism is itself a substantive position, based on views 
that not everyone shares and that need to be elaborated and defended. Without 
such elaboration and defense, there is a risk of incoherence, for instance when 
attitudes of equality and mutual respect for all religions are promoted at the 
social level although such attitudes conflict with the core views of one or more 
of the religions involved. Social contracts founded on contradictions of this 
sort are inherently unstable.
In addition, strategies wanting to affirm the goodness of ‘true’ religion 
against its false distortions are often forced to compromise historical truth, 
downplaying or interpreting fancifully unsavoury elements that appear to be‑
long to the central teachings of a given tradition. Caste hierarchy and gender 
inequality are obvious examples, and in many cases oppressive and unjustifiable 
practices like these are rooted in metaphysical and soteriological views legiti‑
mated by core religious texts and institutions. There is no alternative, in such 
cases, to engaging critically with the views themselves, and that means with the 
central tenets of religious traditions. I would argue that it is dangerous not  to 
do so, and dangerous to establish a social habit of eschewing critical evaluation 
of religious views under a prescription to ‘respect’ all religions. Civility and re‑
spect for persons are important virtues of dialogue, but they should not lead to 
a general ban on forms of critique that are oriented towards truth. That orien‑
tation, if repressed, can return in the form of absolutistic claims that then feel 
no need to justify themselves in the face of disagreement (Sikka, 2010). Philo‑
sophical reasoning can in general help to foster this orientation in relation to 
religion. In India, I have been arguing, the academic discipline of philosophy 
has some advantages in doing so over its Western counterparts because of its 
cultural location within Indian traditions of thought and the shape ‘philoso‑
phy’ has assumed as a result.16
16  I have deliberately refrained from giving a prescriptive definition of ‘philosophy’ in this 
essay, preferring an open ‑ended conception that emerges from the examples I have presented. 
Based on these examples, one might tentatively propose that, among other characteristics, 
philosophy can be said to work primarily with concepts and arguments (rather than metaphors, 
images or poetic pronouncements), and is primarily based on experience and reasoning (rather 
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Traditions of philosophical reasoning are not separate or external to reli‑
gious thought in India; the discipline works with a broader and more flex‑
ible conception of ‘reason’; and it contains self ‑transformative practices aiming 
for illumination, wisdom and liberation. Philosophy in India is also a long‑
‑established indigenous tradition of reflection that can function in relative 
safety and independence from communal interests. As a result, the discipline 
can help to keep alive argumentative and truth ‑oriented discourses about the 
subject matters of religion, challenging the notion of religions as communities 
of fixed belief. In fact, philosophy can help individuals to negotiate intelligently 
social processes leading, on the one hand, to the ossification of religion in 
the form of exclusionary identities, and, on the other, to a relativism of con‑
sumerist preference which many find unsatisfying. Globally, it is striking how 
at the same time that religious identities are hardening in some places, they 
are breaking down in others. The latter trend is especially evident in Western 
countries as measured by phenomena like unchurching, the rise of ‘spirituality’, 
and new religious movements. We can all agree that in such climates encour‑
aging tolerance and harmony is a valuable goal. The best way of achieving it, 
however, is not to bracket questions of truth, but to foster respectful, open‑
‑minded modes of critical reflection and dialogue.
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